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ABILITY OF FEDERALLY-INSURED MORTGAGORS
TO CHALLENGE HUD ACTIONS
Two important problems affecting the enforcement and application
of the National Housing Act were recently considered in the federal
district courts. The first-whether a homeowner whose mortgage is
insured by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) has standing to challenge an action by that agency-requires
an affirmative answer if the homeowner is to be afforded access to the
courts. The answer to the second-whether a homeowner will receive
meaningful relief-will affect the administration of HUD mortgage
programs. In Davis v. Romney, plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of
themselves and all homeowners who purchased or would purchase
existing homes through mortgages insured by the Federal Housing
Authority (FHA) under section 221 (d) (2) of the National Housing
Act. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiff-homeowners
alleged that the Secretary of HUD and the local FHA offices, in viola-
tion of their statutory duty,2 had insured mortgages on dwellings that
failed to comply with the local housing code. Plaintiffs also sought
compensatory damages for the financial loss they had suffered or
would suffer as a result of defendants' actions. The district court
held that plaintiffs had standing to bring this action and granted
1. 355 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
2. 12 U.S.C. § 17151 (1970) provides in relevant part:
(a) This section is designed to assist private industry in providing housing
for low and moderate income families and displaced families .... (d) To be
eligible for insurance under this section, a mortgage shall ... (2) be secured
by property upon which there is located a dwelling conforming to applicable
standards prescribed by the Secretary under subsection (f) of this section
and meeting the requirements of all State laws, or local ordinances or regu-
lations, relating to the public health or safety, zoning, or otherwise, which
may be applicable thereto. . . . (f) The property or project shall comply
with such standards and conditions as the Secretary may prescribe to establish
the acceptability of such property ....
(Emphasis added.)
Secretary Romney stated that the Minimum Property Standards of the FHA
"require that a property comply with local ordinances, codes and regulations ....
[The FHA] does require that a property meet the FHA Standards or the local
code, whichever is more stringent." Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking and
Currency on HUD Investigation of Low- and Moderate-Income Housing Pro-
grams, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1971).
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declaratory and injunctive relief. The court also held, however, that
it did not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' prayer for damages. In
Jackson v. Romney 3 a district court, presented with facts similar to
Davis, held that the complainants failed to state a claim upon which
declaratory or injunctive relief might be granted; 4 and, as in Davis,
the court found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs'
claim for damages.
I. STANDING
Traditionally, to establish standing a person must satisfy the con-
stitutional requirement of "case" or "controversy," have a stake in
the outcome,6 have more than a general interest in the alleged wrong,7
and demonstrate an invasion of a legal right or privilege.8 Standing
focuses on the party, not the issues to be adjudicated, and the above
criteria attempt to insure that plaintiff is the proper party to bring
the action.9
In 1968 the Supreme Court in Flast v. Cohen0 began to liberalize
standing requirements. Federal taxpayers brought suit alleging that
federal funds had been disbursed to religious schools under the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 in violation of the
first amendment's establishment clause. The Court held that the
taxpayers had standing, applying "injury in fact" as the test rather
than the prior requirement of "legal interest."" Two years later, in
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp"
3. 355 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1973).
4. While the court stated that it was dismissing the suit for failure to state a
claim, the reasons given for the dismissal concerned plaintiffs' lack of standing.
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
6. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
7. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
8. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940). "Legal right" is a
term of art referring to property or contract rights, rights arising from tortious
invasion, and rights conferred by statute or guaranteed by the Constitution. 23
VAND. L. REv. 814, 816 (1970).
9. 43 MIss. L.J. 538, 539 (1972).
10. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
11. See 43 Miss. L.J. 538, 539 (1972).
12. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Suit had been brought to challenge a ruling by the
Comptroller of the Currency permitting national banks to make data processing
services available to other banks and banking customers. Plaintiff was in the busi-




the Court rejected the "legal interest" test because it went to the
merits, whereas the issue of standing does not. The Court devised
instead a two-part test requiring that plaintiff allege injury in fact-3
and that the interest sought to be protected or regulated be arguably
within the scope of the statute or constitutional guarantee in ques-
tion.1" Applying this new test, the Court granted plaintiff standing.'5
The Court noted that the trend in standing decisions was toward
enlargement of the class of persons who would be allowed to protest
administrative actions and that enlargement of that class of persons
defined as "aggrieved" reflected the trend.1 While the acts relevant
to the case did not specify a protected group, their policy was apparent,
and therefore the parties affected by a broad or narrow interpretation
of the acts were identifiable.' 7
Since the decision in Data Processing, courts have looked directly
to the statutory provisions under which the administrative agency's
13. Id. at 154.
14. Id. at 153.
15. Since the alleged injury resulted from the actions of an administrative
agency, the Court also relied on the Administrative Procedure Act in granting
plaintiffs standing. The Act states: "A person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. §
702 (1970). The Administrative Procedure Act has had little impact on the right
to judicial review other than to codify a presumption existing in case law. The
presumption of reviewability granted to a party whose interests have been acutely
affected by an administrative action began with School of Magnetic Healing v.
McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902), which held that "decisions of the officers of the
department upon questions of law do not conclude the courts, and they have power
zo grant relief to an individual aggrieved by an erroneous decision of a legal
qaestion by department officers." Id. at 108. The Administrative Procedure Act
provides that the presumption will not be extended when the statute specifically
precludes review or when agency action is by law committed to agency discretion.
Tsie Supreme Court held in Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 185 (1956),
itat exemptions from the Act are not to be lightly presumed. When a statute is
silent as to reviewability, the Act grants it. L. JAFF., JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 372 (1965).
16. 397 U.S. at 1541.
17. Id. at 157. In a case decided the same day, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159 (1970), the Court granted standing to tenant farmers to challenge a regula-
tion of the Secretary of Agriculture concerning the definition of "making a crop,"
which determined the assignability of payments. The Court found that the legis-
lative history indicated a congressional intent to benefit the tenant farmers. Id.
at 164-65.
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
action was taken18 or to the national policy reflected by the statute"u
to determine the standing of the parties to the suit. Further, it has
been held that it is not only the primary beneficiaries of the statute
who will be granted standing, but also any intended beneficiaries.20
The Jackson court denied plaintiff-homeowners standing on the
basis of the legal interest test. The court relied on United States v.
Neustadt,21 which denied relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act to
plaintiff-homeowner who had been furnished an inaccurate FHA in-
spection and appraisal report and, in reliance thereon, had purchased
a home at a price in excess of its fair market value. The Court in
Neustadt cited a congressional report emphasizing that the "primary
and predominant objective of the appraisal system was the protection
of the Government and its insurance funds."22 The Court also noted
that the Government had never suggested that the appraisal would
serve as a guarantee to the purchaser of his receiving a good value
for his money.2 3 In light of the Data Processing holding, questions
of "primary and predominant objectives" of a statutory provision
are no longer controlling. The Jackson court's reliance on Neu-
stadt is therefore misplaced. In holding that there is no legal re-
lationship between the FHA and the individual mortgagor24 and
that the restrictions placed on HUD before it may guarantee a mort-
gage do not create a cause of action against the Government on be-
18. Coalition for United Community Action v. Romney, 316 F. Supp. 742
(N.D. Ill. 1970).
19. Peoples v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d
Cir. 1968); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d
Cir. 1965); Nuclear Data, Inc. v. AEC, 344 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. IMI. 1972);
Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
20. Peoples v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
21. 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
22. Id. at 709, citing H.R. REP. No. 2271, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1954).
The Report, however, also states: "Nevertheless, the Congress has consistently
recognized-and intended-that, notwithstanding the fact that, technically there
is no legal relationship betveen the FHA and the individual mortgagor, these
FHA procedures also operate for the benefit and protection of the individual
home buyer." Id.
23. 366 U.S. at 709.





half of any individual mortgagor 2 5 the Jackson court denied plaintiffs
standing on the basis of the legal interest test that Data Processing
discredited.26
The crucial question for standing, given Data Processing, is whether
the low- and middle-income homeowners whose mortgages were in-
sured under section 221 (d) (2) are primary or intended beneficiaries
of the Act. The Davis court tried to answer this question by apply-
ing the zone of interests test and looking to the national policy set
forth in the Act to determine whether plaintiffs had standing. The
Government's stated goal is "a decent home and suitable living
environment for every American family."27 This goal indicates a na-
tional policy to serve the needs of the people and not to focus on
the benefits that the Government or the banking industry will re-
ceive as a result of maintaining a federal mortgage insurance pro-
gram. Congressional reports similarly reflect this national goal. In
making suggestions to improve the housing program, the House Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency urged HUD "to enable potential
beneficiaries to adapt programs more specifically to their individual
needs."28 While the housing and mortgage markets are clearly bene-
ficiaries of the Act, it seems equally clear that low- and middle-income
homeowners who might not otherwise be able to purchase their own
homes are also beneficiaries. Since standing under the zone of in-
terests test is not made "dependent on some process of appraisal to
determine whether the poor people weigh heavier on the scales.., or
. ..should be labeled the 'primary' beneficiaries,"29 it would appear
that homeowners should be given standing.
II. ABILITY TO OBTAIN MEANINGFUL RELIEF
Once granted standing, plaintiff must show that a legal right has
been violated or that a legal duty is owed to him in order to obtain
relief. Being arguably within the zone of interests protected or regu-
lated may not suffice to establish plaintiff's claim for a legal remedy.30
25. 355 F. Supp. at 743.
26. See text at notes 12-14 supra.
27. 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (1970).
28. H.. RrE. No. 1585, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968).
29. Peoples v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561, 564 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
30. See 23 VANn. L. Rv. 814, 820 (1970). See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962), in which the Court stated:
It would not be necessary to decide whether appellants' allegations of im-
1974]
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In Davis the zone of interests test was sufficient to give plaintiffs stand-
ing, thereby enabling them to obtain injunctive and declaratory
relief. The court, however, denied them compensatory damages,
which was the primary relief sought, because the court held that it
lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
Jurisdiction in Davis for plaintiffs' damage claim was based on the
Tucker Act.31 The court determined that it did not have jurisdiction
to hear that claim, relying chiefly on the interpretation given the
Tucker Act in Eastport Steamship Corp. v. United States.s2 Plaintiff
there brought suit to recover monetary damages arising from the loss
of a sale of plaintiff's vessel to a foreign buyer due to defendant's
delay in granting the necessary approval for the sale. The Eastport
court discussed two classes of claims that were cognizable: when
plaintiff asserts a right to either all or part of money paid to (or
property taken by) the government, 3 or when plaintiff has made no
payment of money to the government but alleges that a particular
provision of law expressly or impliedly grants plaintiff the right
to receive the payment of a certain sum.34 Even though a claim may
rest on the Constitution, an act of Congress, or an executive regula-
tion, if the claim cannot fit within one of these two groups, it is be-
yond the court's jurisdiction.35 The test adopted in Eastport is whether
the constitutional clause or the legislation that claimant relies upon
can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the federal
pairment of their votes by the 1901 apportionment will, ultimately, entitle
them to any relief, in order to hold that they have standing to seek it. If
such impariment does produce a legally cognizable injury, they are among
those who have sustained it.
Id. at 208 (emphasis added).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970). The statute reads in part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the
Court of Claims, of: . . . (2) Any other civil action or claim against the
United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive
department... in cases not sounding in tort.
The Court of Claims is granted similar jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970).
32. 372 F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
33. Id. at 1007; see e.g., South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v.
United States, 334 F.2d 622 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965).
34. In the second class of claims, plaintiff must allege that the provisions of
the statute relied upon expressly or impliedly grant him a right to be paid a
certain sum of money. 372 F.2d at 1007; see, e.g., Aycock-Lindsey Corp. v.
United States, 171 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1948).




government for the damages sustained.36 Applying this test, the Davis
court conduded that the housing programs "do not directly or im-
pliedly create a right to a sum of money. These sections do not
authorize or 'command' that money be granted to plaintiffs."37 The
court accordingly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction.
Since section 221 (d) (2) of the Housing Act does not explicitly
provide the compensatory relief sought by the Davis plaintiffs,38 plain-
tiff-homeowners on an appeal would have to rely on an implied right
to monetary damages in order to come within the Davis holding.3 9
The Supreme Court in Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby4° has held:
"A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and
where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial bene-
fit the statute was enacted, the right to recover ... is implied. ... 41
The Court, resting its decision on common law principles, 42 granted
an employee a civil remedy for injuries resulting from a disregard of
the Safety Appliance Act, although the Act itself did not provide for
such a remedy. In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak43 the Court permitted pri-
vate enforcement of the proxy rules of the Securities Exchange Act,
stating that "it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional pur-
pose."" More recently, the Court held that violation of the fourth
amendment right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures gives rise to a cause of action for damages. 45 Neither the
36. Id. at 1009.
37. 355 F. Supp. at 47.
38. Homeowners assisted by 12 U.S.C. § 1715z (1970) (cooperative associa-
tions) can, however, receive compensation under 12 U.S.C. § 1735b(b) (1970),
which authorizes the Secretary "to make expenditures to correct, or compensate
the owner for, structural or other defects which seriously affect the use and liva-
bility of any single-family dwelling which is covered by a mortgage insured under
section 1715z of this title. . . ." A bill is now pending before Congress that would
authorize similar expenditures for dwellings secured by a mortgage insured under
17151. S. 855, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
39. For a general discussion of this problem see 77 HiAv. L. Rlv. 285 (1963).
40. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
41. Id. at 39.
42. Id.
43. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
44. Id. at 443.
45. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
1974]
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statutes nor the constitutional provisions involved expressly granted
the injured party a right to seek compensatory damages. Yet the
Supreme Court extended plaintiffs such a right.
Consistent application of the tests in Rigsby and Borak would ap-
pear to entitle plaintiffs to the damages they seek since the district
court, in finding standing, interpreted the statute violated as con-
ferring a benefit upon homeowners."6 If the Third Circuit, on ap.
peal, were to imply a cause of action, the probability that the agency
would comply with the provisions of the statute would be increased,
which in turn would further the congressional purpose."7
The jurisdictional tests applied in Eastport and Davis are more
stringent than the tests applied by the Supreme Court for an im-
plied right to monetary damages. Eastport may be distinguished
on the basis that the Maritime Commission was given total discretion
in approving sales to foreigners, and plaintiff was forewarned not
only of the need for such approval, but also that such approval could
be withheld altogether.48 In Davis and the Supreme Court decisions
of Rigsby and Borak the statutory requirements were not discretionary
with the administrative agency but were direct mandates. Further-
more, the Davis court had previously decided that the statutory duties
stated in section 221 (d) (2) conferred benefits on plaintiffs. In East-
port the approval or disapproval of a sale of a vessel to foreigners
related to questions of national interest and security, not to the rel-
ative business advantages of the particular sale to plaintiff-seller.
In light of Supreme Court precedent and the fact that Eastport
can be readily distinguished, it appears that the Davis court could
have found jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs' claim for compensa-
tory relief under the Tucker Act. Plaintiffs were within the class
for whose benefit the statute was enacted. The violation of the statute
was dearly wrongful since the administrators violated an express man-
46. The Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee seemed to
indicate that compensatory damages might be appropriate when he stated: "Wo
must see that anyone victimized in the past because of either improper adminis.
tration of the program or the shady actions of a few are made whole." Hcaring
Before the Comm. on Banking and Currency on HUD Investigation of Low.
and Moderate-Income Housing Programs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
47. 77 Huv. L. Rav. 285, 291 (1963).




date, not merely a discretionary one.49 Granting the compensatory
relief sought would further the congressional purpose of decent
homes for American families51 The Data Processing test of stand-
ing, which requires that the party sustain injury in fact and that the
interest to be protected be arguably within the scope of the statute
in question, would seem to give rise to an implied cause of action.
Without an implied remedy for persons so injured, Davis results in
an unjust situation-plaintiffs have standing to challenge the action
of the agency but are unable to obtain any meaningful remedy. This
provides little incentive for persons to bring an action and even less
incentive for the administrative agency to comply with the mandates
of the legislation.51 The tests laid down in Rigsby and Borak may in-
dicate that the Supreme Court would be willing to grant compensatory
relief.
Plaintiffs similar to those in Davis need compensatory relief to im-
prove their homes in order to comply with the local housing codes.
Failure to comply may result in fines that FHA-subsidized home-
owners, due to their low income levels, are unable to pay. Yet it is
their income level that enables them to obtain the federally insured
mortgages and purchase the homes initially. The result is that the
federal government, having assisted the families in the purchase of
their homes, has failed to carry out its duty to prevent potentially
large financial obligations resulting from housing code violations.
Implying a cause of action to grant the Davis plaintiffs compensatory
relief would not involve a large expenditure of federal money. Home-
owners are presently without adequate remedy,52 and compensatory re-
49. After the filing of the action in Davis, a federal grand jury convened in
May 1971 to investigate abuses in the FHA housing programs. Indictments against
70 persons have been handed down, and there have been 33 convictions, includ-
ing those of the former Director and Deputy Director of the Philadelphia Office
of the FHA. Brief for Appellant at 2 n.1, Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360
(3d Cir. 1974).
50. 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (1970).
51. It was the filing of the action in Davis that started the grand jury investi-
gation. Since 70 indictments have resulted, it would appear that private suits
exert more influence on an agency's compliance with the statutory provisions than
does any intragovernmental control.
52. But see note 38 supra.
19741
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
lief would achieve the stated legislative purpose. To subvert a stated
congressional purpose when a remedy can easily be fashioned is
inequitable.*
Claire Halpern
* In a decision handed down early in 1974, Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360
(3rd Cir. 1974), the court of appeals held that, though plaintiffs did have stand-
ing to sue, the class action was improper because the district court failed to com-
ply with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that the
court, as soon as practicable, determine whether a class action may be maintained
and describe the members of that class. The court therefore treated the suit as
one of individual claims by the named plaintiffs. Id. at 1366.
The court vacated the district injunction that prevented defendants from
insuring morgages on homes in Philadelphia that were not in compliance with the
Philadelphia Housing Code. The injunction, in the court's opinion, did not remedy
the harm to the individual plaintiffs since there was no allegation of an intent to
purchase another home under the program. The case was remanded to determinc
whether a more narrowly drawn injunction could be fashioned to fit the needs
of this case. Id. at 1371.
Although the court held that it had jurisdiction under the Tucker Act to
entertain plaintiffs' claim for damages since it was founded upon an act of
Congress, the claim was denied. The court, for reasons similar to those of the
district court, found that the provision requiring the FHA to comply with local
ordinances was intended to assure adequate security for the federal government
for the mortgage and held that no cause of action for damages would be implied.
Id. at 1370-72.
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